One article likely to be of particular interest to loyal readers is Michael Mello's, "Executing the Mentally Ill: When Is Someone Sane Enough to Die?" Here's the beginning:
Mental illness is a phenomenon that knifes across the entire corpus of our criminal justice system. From interrogations and waivers of Miranda rights, to consent to searches and seizures, to plea negotiations and the capacity to stand trial, to calculating sentences and participating in appellate and postconviction proceedings, mental illness warps the machinery of our criminal law and challenges its most cherished assumptions about free will, decisional competence, and culpability. This is so regardless of whether or not life hangs in the balance. But when the stakes are life and death, the structural distortions caused by mental illness become magnified, and the contradictions can rise to constitutional magnitude.
Death is different, according to the Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence. Three doctrinal differences are particularly important here. First, the relevancy standard at penalty trials is capacious: Any significant limitations on the defense’s ability to present, or the sentencer’s ability to consider and give independent mitigating weight to, mental health evidence will void the resulting death sentence. Second, the standards for waiving appeals are more stringent in capital cases, and the attorney’s ethical obligations triggered by such waivers are more vague and complicated. Third, the Constitution forbids executing the presently insane. Although these three doctrines are related, I will focus here on the last.
The mental illness index is here.